We extend the Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) model by introducing asymmetric groups of varieties in terms of degree of product di¤erentiation. The introduction of these di¤erent market segments in the demand system allows us to structurally derive more complex relations between …rm productivity, size and markups, which ultimately depend on the degree of product di¤erentiation, for both the closed and open economy settings. The theoretical results are tested at the empirical level by comparing the performance of French wine producers in market segments characterized by heterogeneous levels of product di¤erentiation, de…ned geographically based on the "Denomination of Controlled Origin" areas.
Introduction
We extend the Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) theoretical model by introducing asymmetric groups of product varieties. The asymmetry is related to the level of substitutability across varieties within di¤erent groups. In particular, in our framework consumers still choose between a homogeneous good and a continuum of di¤erentiated varieties, indexed by i 2 . However, is now split in multiple subsets, each characterized by a di¤erent level of product di¤erentiation. These subsets correspond to narrowly de…ned competitive segments within a single industry, e.g. standard vs. luxury cars, to follow the example by Goldberg (1995) . By introducing di¤erent segments in the demand system, we are able to derive more complex relations between productivity, size, markups and …rms' export engagement, all crucially moderated by the level of product di¤erentiation within the segment. This helps in explaining the non-linear relations between …rm productivity, size, mark-ups and exporting behavior observed in our data, even within a narrow 4-digit industry.
We are certainly not the …rst to explore the empirical oddities of the relationship between productivity, …rm's size and export status. In particular, Hallak and Sivadasan (2009) discuss how most of the existing models of …rm heterogeneity and international trade leave much of the observed relationship between …rm size and export status unexplained. To that extent, they provide cross-country evidence of the fact that …rm size is not monotonically related with export status: there are small …rms that export and large …rms that only operate in the domestic market. They explain the latter …nding through a model that employs a Dixit-Stiglitz CES demand function, augmented in order to account for product quality variation across varieties (as in Hallak and Schott 2008) . On the supply side they introduce, in addition to productivity, another source of heterogeneity: the "caliber", de…ned as the ability of …rms to produce quality using fewer …xed inputs.
In our setup, on the contrary, we do not explicitly model quality. Rather, we try to make sense of the non-linear relations between …rm productivity, size, mark-ups and the exporting behavior by modelling di¤erent market segments within a linear demand system with endogenous markups, allowing …rms to choose in which (exclusive) market segment they compete 1 .
For the sake of simplicity, and without loss of generality, we focus on the case in which is split in two separate subsets: l and h . Where l is assumed to be the subset of varieties witnessing a "low" degree of product di¤erentiation, while h contains those varieties characterized by a "high" degree of product di¤erentiation. We derive a number of results for both the closed and open economy settings. First, the price elasticity of demand is lower for the highly di¤erentiated varieties in h than for their counterparts in l , where substitutability is higher. Second, concerning producers, the cost cut-o¤ for survival is higher in h than in l .
1 The non-linearity recorded at the empirical level is not the result of the level of aggregation. Indeed, even in the multi-product setting by Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano (2009) , all products are treated as symmetric from a demand perspective, and thus, to the extent that heterogeneous product di¤erentiation plays a role in the …rm-level performance measures and productivity, a non-linear relation is likely to be detected also at the product-level.
So, some less productive …rms can survive in the high-di¤erentiation sector, while they would exit in the low-di¤erentiation one. This result is explained by the fact that, given the same cost draw c, a …rm in the high-di¤erentiation sector charges a higher price and thus obtains a higher markup than a …rm in the low-di¤erentiation sector. Unlike for prices and markups, the output relation between two …rms with the same productivity in l and h is not obvious. Indeed, we prove that the ratio of …rm output in l over h is greater than 1 for low levels of c (i.e. high productivity), and decreases for increasing levels of the cost draw, becoming lower than 1 after a certain threshold.
Opening up to trade has the same pro-competitive e¤ects as in Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) .
In particular, the minimum productivity level which is required in order to survive in the domestic market grows. As long as trade liberalization is symmetric across sectors, the impact of trade is exactly proportional for …rms in l and h . Hence, all the closed-economy di¤erences between the two sectors are con…rmed in the open economy case. Moreover, one further important di¤erence between l and h emerges in terms of exporters'productivity. In fact we have that the cost cut-o¤ for exporting is lower in the low-di¤erentiation sector than in the highdi¤erentiation one. This means that relatively less productive …rms self-select into exporting in h as compared to l , where selection is tougher. Thus, the relation between …rm productivity and export engagement across sectors is crucially moderated by the sector-speci…c level of product di¤erentiation.
The theoretical results are tested at the empirical level by comparing the performance of French wine producers in market segments characterized by heterogenous levels of product differentiation. These segments are de…ned geographically, based on the "Denomination of Controlled Origin" areas. The analysis focuses on around 1,000 producers, observed over the time span 1999-2008. The empirical evidence supports the testable predictions of the model. First, producers in the high-di¤erentiation segment are found to obtain higher price-cost margins relative to …rms in the low-di¤erentiation group. Second, at low levels of productivity, …rms in the high-di¤erentiation segment are bigger than …rms in the low-di¤erentiation one. However, this relation is inverted as TFP grows, after a certain threshold. Finally, exporters in the high-di¤erentiation segment display a relatively lower productivity premium than in the lowdi¤erentiation segment, consistent with the idea of a milder selection being associated to a lower level of substitutability across varieties.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the theoretical model. In section 3 we discuss the three main testable predictions. The empirical analysis is presented in section 4, while section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical model
Model setup: consumers
Consumers choose between an homogeneous good and a continuum of di¤erentiated varieties, indexed by i 2 . In particular, the set is split in two separate subsets: l and h , where l is assumed to be the subset (or market segment) of varieties characterized by a "low" degree of product di¤erentiation, while h contains those varieties characterized by a "high" degree of product di¤erentiation.
Formally, considering an economy with L consumers, each supplying one unit of labour, the utility function of a representative consumer can be written as:
where = l; h indicates the high vs. low di¤erentiation market segment, q o stands for the consumption level of the homogeneous good (taken as a numeraire), q i represents the consumption level for each variety i 2 , with l \ h = and l [ h = . Di¤erently from MelitzOttaviano (2008) , the parameters , and , all positive, are not unique, but speci…c to each of the two market segments ( l and h ).
By solving the consumer problem, and assuming a positive demand for the numeraire good (q o > 0), we can obtain the inverse demand function of each variety in each of the two subsets l and h :
where
By focusing, as in Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) , on the subsets of consumed varieties l and h (s.t. q i > 0), equation (2) can be inverted to retrieve the following linear market demand system for each market segment:
where N indicates the number of consumed varieties in l and h , with average prices equal
From the inverse demand function, we can derive the price condition in order for a variety to display a positive consumption level (i.e. q i > 0). We assume, without loss of generality, that and are equal across the two market-segments, while h > l > 0, i.e. a greater utility "penalty" is attached to the uneven consumption of highly di¤erentiated varieties ( h ), while less di¤erentiated varieties ( l ) can be consumed in uneven patterns with a relative smaller loss ( h > l ) in terms of utility. The latter yields:
From here we can express the price elasticity of demand for the two subsets of varieties as follows:
Hence, product varieties are allowed to be asymmetric in our model 2 . In order to give an illustrative example, we may think about two di¤erent segments of the car industry, e.g. standard vs. luxury cars. It has been shown, for instance by Goldberg (1995) , that di¤erent varieties of standard cars are closer substitutes than varieties of cars in the luxury segment. The same argument can be extended to the di¤erentiated products of virtually all other industries in which it can be assumed that di¤erent segments of the market vary in market structure and density of products, thus providing a rationale for a partition of the di¤erentiated goods' set ( ) such as ours. Alternatively, one could think of di¤erent degrees of product di¤erentiation as correlated (also, but not necessarily only) to a di¤erent quality of the considered products, as an increase in the latter is known to induce a higher degree of product di¤erentiation (and thus a lower elasticity of substitution) across products 3 .
In order to focus on the role of the -parameters, let us assume that the average price and number of consumed varieties in the high-di¤erentiation sector are not smaller than in the low-di¤erentiation one, that is N h N l and p h p l , both plausible assumptions, while h > l . Then it can be shown from eq. (4) that p h max > p l max , which in turn implies " h i < " l i . Hence we have that consumers are willing to pay a higher maximum price for varieties in the high di¤erentiation sector, as compared to the low di¤erentiation one. Consistently, the price elasticity of demand is lower for the highly di¤erentiated varieties in h than for their counterparts in l , where substitutability is higher. This result is intuitive and, as already discussed, in line with the empirical evidence.
Model setup: Firms
We maintain the same assumptions as in Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) . In particular, labor is the only factor of production and is inelastically supplied in a competitive market. The production of the homogeneous good requires one unit of labour, under constant returns to scale. Since this numeraire good is sold in a competitive market, a unit wage is implied.
Entry in the di¤erentiated sector involves a sunk cost, which is related to product development and start-up investments. An entrepreneur can decide whether to entry in the low-2 Clearly if h = l = then we fall back in the original Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) symmetric speci…cation, where all varieties are assumed to share the same level of product di¤erentiation.
3 See e.g. Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) or Goldberg (1995) for providing empirical evidence of these arguments. Coibion et al. (2007) discuss a unifying theoretical framework for these …ndings.
di¤erentiation market segment ( l ), paying a sunk cost f l E , or in the high-di¤erentiation one ( h ), at cost f h E . Having paid the sunk cost, independently on the chosen market segment, each …rm draws an inverse productivity parameter c from the same common distribution G(c),
Here c represents the …rm-level marginal cost (in terms of units of labour) for the production of the di¤erentiated good. There are no …xed costs, so the technology is characterized by constant returns to scale. Hence, those …rms that can cover the marginal cost start producing, while the others exit.
Competition in each of the di¤erentiated market segments is of a monopolistic nature, with each …rm in facing a residual demand function as in eq. 3. As the choice of the high vs.
low di¤erentiation subset of varieties in which to produce is exclusive (a …rm cannot produce in both), we can optimize the …rm decision within each market segment. In particular, optimum price p(c) and output q(c) must satisfy the following condition:
If the pro…t maximing price is above the relevant p max the …rm exits. Thus the marginal …rm (indi¤erent between staying and exiting) in each market segment is characterized by a cuto¤ cost level c D such that its price is driven down to the marginal cost (p(c D ) = c D = p max ), and the demand goes to zero. We assume that both cuto¤s c l D and c h D are lower than the upper bound of costs c M , which implies that those …rms with a cost draw between the cut-o¤ level and c M do exit, while the others stay in the market and earn positive pro…ts.
Equilibrium in the closed economy
Equating demand (3) and supply (6) and using the expression for the cuto¤ derived in (4) allows us to solve for the optimal price p (c):
and from here for the optimal …rm's size q (c) and markup (c) in each market segment:
Analogously, it is then possible to solve for the …rm-speci…c revenues and pro…ts:
Assuming market segment-speci…c sunk entry costs f E , the model can then be solved for the closed-economy free entry equilibrium as in Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) .
Equilibrium in the open economy
As in Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) For each market segment we now have a country-speci…c maximum price such that a variety displays a positive consumption level:
where as before N is the total number of …rms (both domestic and foreign) selling sector goods in country , and p is the average price of sector goods sold in country (across both domestic and foreign producers).
Since national markets are segmented and production is characterized by constant returns to scale, each …rm in country solves two dinstinct pro…t maximization problems, one for the domestic and one for the export market, within each and the same market-segment . Solving within each market segment, we can follow Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) and derive:
where p D (c) and q D (c) are the domestic pro…t maximizing price and quantity, while p X (c) and q X (c) are the pro…t maximizing delivered price and quantity for the export market.
As only …rms earning non-negative pro…ts in a certain market (domestic vs. foreign) will decide to sell in that market, this determines the existence of two di¤erent cost cut-o¤s for domestic versus foreign sales in each country-market segment pair. We call c D the upper bound cost for …rms in market segment selling in their domestic market (country ). The upper bound cost for exporters to country is instead c X . These cuto¤s must satisfy:
The last equation clearly shows how trade costs make it harder for exporters to break even relative to domestic producers selling in their home market, and how, also for exporters, the cuto¤ is in any case market segment-speci…c. Controlling for the market segment-speci…c expression of the cuto¤ in the open economy, the model can then be solved as in Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) .
Firm-level performance measures, on both the domestic and foreign market, can be written in terms of the cost cut-o¤s:
Model implications and testable predictions
In the previous section we have shown that
This now implies that c h D > c l D , i.e. the cost cut-o¤ for survival is higher in h than in l . As a result, some less productive …rms (with costs ranging between c l D and c h D ) can survive in the high-di¤erentiation market segment, while they would exit in the low-di¤erentiation one.
In particular, since c h D > c l D , from equations (7) and (9) we have the following:
Proposition 1 Given the same cost draw c, a …rm in h will charge a higher price and will thus obtain a higher markup than a …rm in l .
The latter provides an explanation for the survival of relatively less productive …rms in the high-di¤erentiation market segment as compared to the low-di¤erentation one, and is again consistent with empirical evidence. For instance, Goldberg (1995) estimated producers'markups to be higher for luxury cars than for standard ones.
However, looking at equations (8 and 11) the equilibrium levels of output and pro…ts between two …rms with the same productivity (1=c) operating in di¤erent market segments ( l and h )
are not obvious. In particular, it is possible to prove the following:
Proposition 2 The ratio of …rm output in l over h is > 1 for low levels of c, and decreases for increasing levels of the cost draw, becoming < 1 after a threshold level c T .
Proof. First, by equating the optimal quantities q l (c) and q h (c) from eq. 8 we can derive
If the latter holds, it is straightforward to prove that c T < c l D < c h D and hence that a level of the cost draw exists, at which a …rm operates in either the high or the low di¤erentiated market segment (as the threshold is smaller than both cuto¤s) with the same optimal size. In order to study the variation in the optimal size around the threshold, for any cost level below c T , say c T , we would have from eq. 8 that the optimal quantities in the two market segments are equal up to a term
. From here, since h > l , it follows that q l (c) > q h (c). Symmetrically, for any cost level c T + the optimal quantities would be equal up to a term
More in general, considering a continuum of di¤erent product di¤erentiation levels , it can be shown (from eq. 8) that the sign of
changes from negative to positive, as c grows from
The implication of the above proposition is that highly productive …rms operating in the highdi¤erentiation segment have an optimal size smaller than …rms with similar levels of productivity operating in the low-di¤erentiation segment, and viceversa. This result is described graphically in Figure 1 . Notice that the quantity di¤erence between the two sectors (in absolute value) is directly proportional to the distance of each …rm from the threshold 1=c T and to the di¤erence in the degrees of product di¤erentiation ( h l ).
The described result has an intuitive explanation: if two …rms are very productive (low c), then the …rm in the low-di¤erentiation market segment will produce a greater output with respect to the …rm operating in the high-di¤erentiation segment. In fact, the former can leverage upon the favourable cost draw to a larger extent, thanks to the high substitutability across varieties.
Using again the example of the car sector, the optimal size of a highly e¢ cient (c < c T ) producer of 'luxury'cars (high-di¤erentiation) would be smaller than that of an equally e¢ cient producer of 'standard' cars (low-di¤erentiation). The reverse will be true if the two …rms have a low productivity (high c), for exactly the same reason: for a relatively ine¢ cient …rm it will be easier to attain a relatively higher level of output if varieties are less substitutable for each other. 4 The cost level c at which the derivative becomes positive in each market segment = l; h has the following expression: c = p
From here it is relatively straightforward to prove that c < c D .
Figure 1: The productivity -size relation across di¤erent market segments Mutatis mutandis, the same conclusions are also valid for optimal revenues and pro…ts (eq. 10 and 11) in the closed-economy setting, although the cost threshold c T in this case is lower than for quantities 5 .
As the size and pro…ts of …rms change along the distribution of costs (productivity) with di¤erent slopes in the high vs. low-di¤erentiation market segments, it is interesting to assess how average markups, …rm size and pro…ts compare in the two segments. As the latter would clearly depend on the assumed cost distribution, in the Appendix we follow Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) and model the case of a Pareto distribution of productivity. We show that, under the latter distribution, …rms in h charge higher average prices and earn higher average mark-ups.
However, notwithstanding such higher "per-unit" performance, they are on average smaller in terms of produced output, and thus earn on average less (total) revenues and pro…ts.
Moving to the analysis of exporting …rms, recall that we have assumed the distribution of cost draws G(c) to be constant across countries (as in Melitz-Ottaviano, 2008 ) and market segments; moreover, we have not di¤erentiated trade costs for …rms in l and h . As a result, prima facie the impact of trade appears to be completely symmetric in both market segments, as the change in the cost cuto¤s induced by economic integration has exactly the same proportion in both h and l .
In particular, we still have that c l D < c h D , which implies that, for a given cost c, …rms in h charge a higher price and earn higher markups. However, in an open economy context, one further important di¤erence between l and h emerges in terms of exporters'productivity. In fact we have that c l X < c h X , i.e. the cost cut-o¤ for exporting is lower in the low-di¤erentiation sector than in the high-di¤erentiation one. Hence it is straightforward to prove the following: 5 In other words, in the case of, e.g., pro…ts, the crossing of the h and l lines in the previous graph takes place at a lower threshold c T ; as a result, one would have a larger share of relatively less e¢ cient …rms (c > c T ) in the high di¤erentiation market segment which are more pro…table than their equally e¢ cient counterparts in the low di¤erentiation one. This follows from the fact that …rms in h charge higher prices and earn higher markups than their counterparts in l .
Proposition 3 Self-selection into exporting in h requires a relatively smaller productivity premium than in l
Proof. From equations (15) and (16) The latter …nding extends the previous results of Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) to a di¤erentiated demand system also in the open economy case, and conveys a very interesting message: the relation between …rm productivity and export engagement across market segments is moderated by the segment-speci…c level of product di¤erentiation.
More explicitly, while it holds true that the relatively more productive …rms within each sector do export, the minimum productivity level (the productivity premium) which is required for becoming an exporter is inversely proportional to the level of product di¤erentiation, with the high-di¤erentiation market segment displaying a relatively lower productivity premium.
Intuitively, this result comes from the fact that …rms operating in market segments characterised by a high level of product di¤erentiation are relatively more protected from competition (they charge higher prices and have higher markups) and thus face relatively less the product market competition induced by the process of economic integration, which in the Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) framework is the driving force behind the self-selection of …rms into exporting.
Clearly, all these theoretical insights calling for a relation between productivity, size / profitability and export activity, which crucially depends on the level of product di¤erentiation within each market segment, open the way for interesting empirical analyses, to which we now turn.
Empirical evidence
The empirical test of our theoretical predictions is conducted by analysing …rm-level performance measures of the French wine-making industry (NACE-Rev. 2, 1102). There are two main reasons for such a choice. The most important one is the divisibility of the industry in multiple segments de…ned by a speci…c protocol (the "Appellation d'Origine Contrôlée") which is well known to consumers, so that each segment can be characterized by a speci…c set of product characteristics and a level of product di¤erentiation. The second reason is the availability of …rm-level data including information on export activities (i.e. exports as a share of turnover) for each producer.
We …rst present the French wine industry and discuss its peculiar structure. We then move to the description of the …rm-level dataset, and discuss our estimation of TFP. Finally, we focus on the empirical tests for each of the three propositions presented in the previous section.
The French AOC market segments
The French wine-making industry has been historically characterized by a strong geographicalbased partition. Since 1935, a law decree has introduced a system of denomination of controlled origin: the "Appellation d'Origine Contrôlée" (AOC henceforth). Within this system, a given AOC wine can be labelled and sold as such 'if and only if'the production takes place within a speci…c geographic area, which can be as narrow as one municipality. This is meant to enhance and value the deep linkages between a certain wine and a speci…c territory, with its combination of peculiar climatic and geological conditions, grape varieties as well as production techniques.
As a result, wines sharing the same denomination do share some distinctive technical characteristics, and ultimately a distinctive taste: a Bordeaux is de…nitely di¤erent than a Bourgogne, and both are di¤erent from a generic non-AOC table wine. Moreover, there is room for substantial product di¤erentiation within each denomination, to a larger or lesser extent depending on the speci…c area: within Bordeaux, for instance, a Margaux is di¤erent than a Pomerol.
Going back to our model, in case many varieties of the same wine are available, within the same range of quality levels, consumers are expected to attach a greater utility penalty to uneven consumption, i. As di¤erent AOC vs. non-AOC areas can be used in order to identify market segments witnessing heterogeneous degrees of product di¤erentiation, the model propositions will be tested by comparing the performance of wine producers across di¤erent AOCs and, most importantly, with respect to a control group of wine-makers located outside of any AOC area.
The …rst step in the empirical analysis has thus been that of identifying the AOC areas. After downloading and merging all these lists, we have noticed that the same municipality can appear in the list of several denominations. The most evident case is that of Vosne-Romanée, in the Burgundy region. A small town where wines can be produced with 15 di¤erent denominations, from the standard "Bourgogne" to the exclusive "Romanée-Conti". In order to address such situations we have aggregated di¤erent denominations in broader homogeneous groups, in such a way that each municipality is assigned to a unique AOC broader area. This is extremely important for identifying the market segment of each producer in the …rm-level dataset, based on the …rm's address.
Following this …rst step, a second re-aggregation of homogeneous areas in macro AOC areas has been performed, in line with the classical subdivision of the French wine industry. Given the choice of our sector, we focus on the NACE (Rev. 2) 4-digit industry: "1102", named "Manufacture of wine from grape". For this industry AMADEUS reports data on 1,124
French …rms. For each of them, we do have information on the municipality where they are located. This allows us to identify all the producers being active in one of the AOC areas, as well as the control group of companies located outside any of these areas. After dropping a handful of clearly problematic companies (e.g. obvious mistakes in the data input process), and those …rms located in the "Cognac" area (see the previous footnote), we are left with 1,095 …rms. Table 1 reports the distribution of the …rms in our sample across AOC areas. As it can be seen, the largest group of producers is the Champagne one, with 392 …rms, followed by the Languedoc-Roussillon, with 180 companies. Also, 129 …rms in our dataset are located outside any AOC area, and will constitute the control group for the upcoming analyses. Since all the testable propositions in our model crucially deal with …rms' productivity, we 7 A distinct "Cognac" area has also been identi…ed. However, we have decided not to consider it, given the particular nature of this product, which is a spirit rather than a wine. Accordingly, producers located in the Cognac area will be dropped from the analysis. See the next section.
start by discussing our estimates of TFP. First, we estimate total factor productivity through OLS, by regressing value added (output minus materials) over capital and labor inputs (employment). Physical output is proxied by de ‡ated turnover. The employed de ‡ators are speci…c to the 4-digit industry, and are published by the French National Statistical Institute. Materials'costs are de ‡ated using input de ‡ators obtained from the EU-KLEMS database 8 . Finally, capital is proxied by tangible …xed assets, de ‡ated using the GDP de ‡ator.
Second, given the well known simultaneity problems of OLS estimates (see Van Beveren, 2010 , for a review), we obtain TFP estimates by applying the value-added version of the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) algorithm. The results from both estimations can be compared in Table 2 . In line with expectations, the labor coe¢ cient is signi…cantly reduced, from 0.69 to 0.51. We take the Levinsohn-Petrin estimates as our benchmark in the subsequent analyses. Third, as a robustness check we also estimate TFP through the Index Numbers methodology, as applied by Aw et al. (2001) . With this methodology, the e¢ ciency of each …rm (in each year)
is computed relative to a hypothethical …rm (in the base year). The hypothetical …rm has input revenue shares equal to the arithmetic mean of revenue shares over all observations, and log input levels equal to the arithmetic mean of the log of the inputs over all the observations (in the base year).
More in detail, the TFP index for a …rm f in year t is de…ned as:
where i = 1::n indexes the employed inputs, Y f t stands for the output, while X if t is the level of each employed input. The term s if t is the share of …rm's expenditure for input i out of total revenues while ln Y t , ln X it and s it stand for the corresponding arithmetic means over all …rms in year t.
In our application, the base year is 1999. Output and materials are proxied by de ‡ated turnover and material costs (see above), while the number of employees is used as the labor input. The revenue shares of materials and labor are computed by taking the ratio of materials and labor costs over turnover, in nominal terms. The capital share is instead computed as a residual, by relying on the product-exhaustion theorem.
Tables 3 and 4 report some descriptive statistics for the three di¤erent measures of productivity, as well as their correlations. As expected, the three measures are all positively and signi…cantly correlated, with some di¤erences. In particular, the correlation between LevinsohnPetrin and Index Numbers estimates is somewhat lower, about 0.44. This provides an interesting room for the robustness check of our …ndings. 
Test of the model' s propositions
Our model predicts that markups rise with …rm productivity with the same slope within each market segment (eq. 9). However, such a markup/TFP linear relation is predicted to have a di¤erent intercept in di¤erent segments. Indeed, the …rst proposition of our model states that, at any given level of productivity, …rms in the high-di¤erentiation segment charge a higher price and thus obtain a higher markup than …rms in the low di¤erentiation segment. Assuming the latter holds, then pooling together producers of di¤erent segments should result in a high variance of markups at each level of productivity.
This is in line with the evidence reported in Figure 2 , where price-cost margins are plotted against the logarithm of TFP 9 . As it can be seen, price-cost margins show a great variance for most levels of productivity. This could not be explained by the standard Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) model. Indeed when focusing on a narrow 4-digit industry such as this, we would expect to see a "clean" linear relation between mark-ups and TFP, with little variation in price-cost margins at each level of productivity. Our extended model can in principle make sense of such an unexpected pattern, as the latter could be explained by the fact that we are pooling together di¤erent market segments. In fact, when we restrict the previous plot to only one of our AOC areas (the Burgundy region, reported in Figure 3 as an example) we do get a much more linear picture in the productivity/markup relation. Table 5 reports the result of an econometric test of the latter hypothesis for all AOC vs.
non-AOC market segments. Column 1 reports the results from a simple regression of pricecost margins over TFP (Levinsohn-Petrin) and a constant. In column 2 we add a set of AOC dummies, keeping the non-AOC producers as the control group. As expected, the TFP coe¢ cient is positive and stable across the two speci…cations. In line with our model, however, the AOC dummies are jointly di¤erent from zero, and statistically di¤erent from each other. 
Lev-Pet Index Numbers OLS
Hence, as expected, producers of di¤erent AOC segments seem to be competing in di¤erent strategic groups. When looking at the individual AOC e¤ects, we can see that most of the signi…cant ones are positive, in line with Proposition 1. The only two exceptions are "Provence"
and "Rhône". The magnitudes of the e¤ects are meaningful. For instance, given the same level of TFP, a producer of Champagne is predicted to obtain a 4% price-cost margin premium with respect to a …rm located outside of any AOC area. Such …ndings are robust to employing di¤erent measures of TFP. In particular, columns 3 and 4 report the outcome of the same regressions when employing Index Numbers estimates of productivity. The most evident change is an increase in the linear term, from 0.05 to around 0.17 10 .
In Table 6 , focusing on the Levinsohn-Petrin estimates of productivity, we collapse the set of AOC dummies into a single one, which identi…es all the …rms located in either one of the 10 areas.
1 0 The "wine expert" reader might be worried by the negative coe¢ cient on the "Bourgogne" dummy. Reassuringly, and in line with the predictions of our model, that negative coe¢ cient disappears when excluding the producers of "Beaujolais" from the broad "Bourgogne" group.
Having assumed that AOC areas, overall, can be seen as a high-di¤erentiation segment relative to the low-di¤erentiation "non-AOC" one, this is the most straighforward test of Proposition 1.
The outcome is in line with our hypothesis, i.e. the overall AOC dummy e¤ect is positive and statistically signi…cant. We now turn to the analysis of the size/TFP relation. Our model predicts size to be an increasing function of TFP within each segment. However, such a function has both a di¤erent intercept and a di¤erent slope for di¤erent market segments (eq. 8). Proposition 2 actually states that, for low levels of productivity, …rms in the high-di¤erentiation segment are bigger than their counterparts in the low-di¤erentiation segment. This relation is inverted as the level of productivity grows, after a certain TFP threshold. Table 7 reports the outcome of an econometric test on the size/TFP relation, where size is proxied by de ‡ated turnover.
In column 1, size is simply regressed over TFP and a constant. In column 2, we add the full set of AOC dummies and their interactions with TFP, thus allowing for both intercepts and slopes to vary across di¤erent segments. The results are in line with expectations: both the AOC dummies and their interactions are jointly di¤erent from zero, and statistically di¤erent from each other. This holds true for each of the three measures of TFP. Looking across columns, basically all of the intercepts are estimated to be positive, while the opposite holds true for the interactions.
In Table 8 , the set of AOC dummies has been again collapsed into a single overall dummy.
We are thus directly comparing the high-di¤erentiation AOC broad segment relative to the lowdi¤erentiation non-AOC one. The results are perfectly in line with Figure 1 . For low levels of productivity, …rms tend to be bigger in the high-di¤erentiation segment (i.e. role of the positive intercept). However, as TFP increases, size grows faster in the low-di¤erentiation segment (i.e.
role of the negative interactions). Therefore, as stated in Proposition 2, we expect the initial size-productivity relation across segments to be inverted after a certain threshold of productivity. Table 9 reports a direct test of this prediction. The average size of …rms has been computed within each decile of the overall TFP distribution, both for AOC and non-AOC …rms. The …ndings are clear: AOC …rms are on average bigger for the lowest levels of TFP. This relation is inverted after the fourth decile, thus providing a direct con…rmation of our Proposition 2. In so far we have found signi…cant evidence on both the PCM/TFP and size/TFP relations, across di¤erent market segments, in line with our theoretical predictions.
However, it could well be the case that the AOC dummies introduced in our empirical tests are just capturing generic regional e¤ects, instead of any speci…c role of the distinct market segments, as our model postulates. Indeed, if that would be the case, then we would expect to …nd similar patterns in the PCM/TFP and size/TFP relations also for other comparable industries, when introducing the same set of geographical dummies.
In order to rule out this possibility, we have repeated the latter analyses for two other French 4-digit food industries: "Production of meat and poultrymeat products" (NACE-1513) and "Manufacture of bread; manufacture of fresh pastry goods and cakes" (NACE-1581). The reason for selecting these two industries is twofold. First, they arguably produce goods which are less di¤erentiated than wine, at least on a geographic base. Second, when restricting ourselves to the same municipalities covered by the wine-producers database, these industries display a signi…cant coverage in terms of number of …rms reported by AMADEUS, and thus could be used as a valid robustness check.
To that extent, Table 10 replicates the results of Table 6 for the two other industries, imposing exactly the same set of AOC areas as a regional e¤ect. As it can be seen, in both cases the coe¢ cient on the overall AOC dummy is not statistically di¤erent from zero. Thus, regarding Proposition 1, we do not …nd evidence of generic regional e¤ects working in the same way as for the wine industry. Turning to Proposition 2, in Table 11 we replicate the direct test of Table 9 for the meat and bread industries. Again, the results are much di¤erent than those obtained for the wine industry.
In particular, for the meat industry the size/productivity relation looks pretty erratic. Instead, for the bread industry we …nd that …rms located outside of any AOC area are bigger than AOC …rms, on average, at all levels of productivity, i.e. there is no inversion of the relationship as for the 'segmented'wine industry. Overall, such …ndings suggest that our results for the wine producers are indeed likely to be driven by the segmentation of the industry in di¤erent -geographic based -competitive segments, consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model. heterogeneous …rms -our model predicts that the most productive …rms self-select into exporting within each market segment. However, when introducing asymmetric product di¤erentiation, the cut-o¤ levels of productivity inducing self-selection are heterogeneous across di¤erent market segments.
In particular, Proposition 3 states that exporting in the high-di¤erentiation segment requires a lower productivity advantage (over purely domestic …rms) than in the low-di¤erentiation segment. Table 12 presents a direct test for this prediction. The average TFP of exporters is compared to the average TFP across all …rms within each market segment. Not surprisingly, all the ratios are greater than one. This con…rms the idea that exporters are the most productive companies within each segment. And yet, there is quite some variation in the productivity premia. Consistent with Proposition 3, the highest premium (8%) is displayed by exporters in the non-AOC / low-di¤erentiation segment. Instead, the average premium within AOC areas (weighted for the number of …rms in each area) is only 3%. Such a low …gure might also be partly explained by the exporting model of …rms in the AOC areas. In fact, as explained by Crozet et al. (2009) , many of these wine producers do not export directly, but only through specialized dealers, who manage worldwide sales with signi…cant scale economies. This is likely to reduce the per-unit costs of exporting for producers, thus resulting in a milder selection of exporters, and ultimately in lower observed productivity premia.
An exception discussed by the same Crozet et al. (2009) is constituted by the Champagne area, where most producers are also direct exporters. Consistent with the latter feature, we indeed …nd that the TFP premium for Champagne exporters (6%) is the highest among the AOC areas, though still lower than the one for non-AOC producers.
Conclusions and further lines of research
In this paper we have provided a preliminary evidence of the richness of results that can be obtained in terms of the relationship between …rm size, markups and productivity when adding some more structure to the demand system, by introducing in a very simple way an asymmetric degree of product di¤erentiation.
In particular, we have been able to derive three novel and testable propositions on the relationship between productivity and markups, productivity and size and exporting cuto¤s, together with their empirical validation on a speci…c industry, the French wine industry, characterized by o¢ cially de…ned market segments, thanks to the AOC system.
Clearly, these results have to be considered as preliminary, although their robustness opens the way to a number of promising lines of research.
On the theoretical side, in particular, we have insofar treated the di¤erent market segments as entirely separable in the utility function. For instance, any disutility coming from the consumption of the di¤erentiated vs. the homogeneous good in one market segment is currently independent from the same disutility coming from the other market segment. In other words, consumers allocate separately their consumption decisions across the two market segments, with no interactions among them. Secondly, …rms decide ex-ante in which (exclusive) market segment they compete, irrespectively of their productivity draw. Interacting consumers'decisions in the high vs. low-di¤erentiation market segment, as well as discussing alternative ways of modelling the choice of …rms'market segment constitute two possible re…nements of the present model.
On the empirical side, we also need to nest considerations on …rm size with the …rm export status, as insofar we have been able to test only for the (relative) productivity cut-o¤ of exporting …rms, that is modelling their export extensive margins. However, we do not derive insofar any implication for the relation between export status and optimal …rm size in the di¤erent market segments, i.e. the evolution of the …rms'export intensive margins. The latter relation however features prominently in the growing literature on export and quality.
Appendix: average performance measures across market segments Given the result of Proposition 2, in which we have shown that the size and pro…ts of …rms change along the distribution of costs (productivity) with di¤erent slopes in the high vs. lowdi¤erentiation market segment, it is interesting to assess how average markups, …rm size and pro…ts compare among them.
As the latter clearly depends on the assumed distribution of the cost draw G(c), we follow Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) and assume that the productivity draws (1=c) follow a Pareto distribution with lower bound (1=c M ) and shape parameter k 1. The cumulative distribution function for the cost draws (the inverse of productivity) can then be written as G(c) = In equilibrium, the expected …rm pro…ts (net of sunk entry costs) for a potential entrant need to be equal to zero, for both market segments. Hence, from equation (11), we can write: 
Equations 26-31 allow us to draw a set of important conclusions for the comparison of average …rm performance in l vs. h . Having shown that c h D > c l D (given f l E = f h E ), it follows that …rms in h are on average less productive (higher c), they charge higher average prices and earn higher average mark-ups. However, notwithstanding such higher "per-unit" performance, …rms in h are on average smaller in terms of produced output, and thus earn on average less (total) revenues and pro…ts.
While the …rst results on average productivity, prices and mark-ups do not add much to the previous …ndings for the general G(c) case, the second set of conclusions about average output, revenues and pro…ts are very interesting. In fact, Proposition 2 shows that given two …rms -one in l and the other in h -with an equal cost draw c, the relation between output, revenues and pro…ts for the two market segments changes according to c. In particular, for low levels of costs (highly productive …rms), we have that output, revenues and pro…ts are higher in l , while the opposite holds true for cost levels above a certain threshold. For the Pareto case, we have found out that the …rst pattern prevails on average, i.e. …rms in h are on average smaller and earn less revenues and pro…ts than their counterparts in l .
Finally, solving the model for the equilibrium number of …rms, given an equal number of entrants in the two sectors we also have that N h > N l . In fact, it is true that entrepreneurs in both l and h share the same distribution of cost draws G(c). However, since c h D > c l D , …rms in the high-di¤erentiation sector enjoy a higher chance of survival. This result is again not speci…c to the Pareto case, but holds true for any parametrization of G(c).
